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ABSTRACT 
Our decision-making processes are becoming more data driven, 
based on data from multiple sources, of different types, processed 
by a variety of technologies. As technology becomes more relevant 
for decision processes, the more likely they are to be subjects of 
attacks aimed at disrupting their execution or changing their 
outcome. With the increasing complexity and dependencies on 
technical components, such attempts grow more sophisticated and 
their impact will be more severe. This is especially important in 
scenarios with shared goals, which had to be previously agreed to, 
or decisions with broad social impact. We need to think about our 
decisions-making and underlying data analysis processes in a 
systemic way to correctly evaluate benefits and risks of specific 
solutions and to design them to be resistant to attacks. To reach 
these goals, we can apply experiences from threat modeling 
analysis used in software security. We will need to adapt these 
practices to new types of threats, protecting different assets and 
operating in socio-technical systems. With these changes, threat 
modeling can become a foundation for implementing detailed 
technical, organizational or legal mitigations and making our 
decisions more reliable and trustworthy. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Internet and mobile devices changed our interactions and 
communication patterns, and we can see how data analysis 
technologies are changing our decision-making practices and 
habits. New technologies become a natural foundation for our daily 
decisions that impact all aspects of our lives: personal, social, 
economic and political. They lead to new types of businesses, 
opportunities and relationships and can make our decision-making 
processes more effective, accurate and rational. This is especially 
important for decision situations with shared goals, which had to be 
agreed to, or decisions with broad social impact, as they usually 
require significant transparency, accountability and independence. 
But we live in an imperfect world and we should never focus only 
on opportunities and benefits of new solutions. New technologies 
enable new scenarios that lead to new threats, which may require 
new mitigations. As technology becomes more useful and 
prevalent, decision processes based on data analysis will be targets 
of attacks aimed at disrupting their execution or changing their 
outcome. There are different technical, legal or organizational 
methods that can be used to mitigate such threats. But to implement 
them successfully, we need a systemic approach to understand and 
evaluate risks so that we could make informed decisions about 
design of our processes and dependencies on specific data sources 
or data processing components. We can base such analysis on threat 
modeling methodologies from software security, as they were 
specifically designed to look at complex systems from an attacker’s 
point of view [1]. 
DECISION-MAKING BASED ON DATA 
ANALYSIS  
The changes in our decision-making patterns are consequences of 
increasing availability of data, which were limited and had to be 
actively searched and acquired before the digital revolution. 
Currently we are usually much closer to a state of information 
overload than sensory deprivation as there is a lot of data that are 
automatically collected and easily available (at least theoretically). 
We need data analysis solutions to overcome our cognitive 
limitations and transform these huge amounts of data into relevant 
information that could be used in our decision processes.  
Fortunately, there has been great progress in data analysis 
technologies, by which we understand the whole ecosystem of 
methods for gathering, storing, processing and presenting data, 
including algorithms and models from domains like statistics, 
machine learning, decision support and artificial intelligence. We 
can use them in practice, since increases in computational power 
and networking bandwidth made data processing, storing and 
sharing much more available. As a result, our decision making 
becomes depended on multiple data processing components and 
heads towards including AI agents, as frontends to external analysis 
services, or operating as active participants. 
2.1.BENEFITS AND RISKS 
The benefits of relying our decision processes upon data analysis 
solutions are undeniable, as the results can be more effective, 
accurate and rational. Decision-making can use technology in many 
different ways, from support for data exploration, through 
acquisition of our preferences, to delegating the whole processes to 
autonomous systems. Let’s take a look at an example of a simple 
configuration of human decision makers, who are presented with 
several decision options analyzed by external analysis algorithms 
and models using data from multiple sources (see Figure 1). This is 
a common scenario that covers, for example, a company trying to 
change their operations to be more data driven.  
Unfortunately, there are potential problems and risks related to 
complexity, unverified assumptions and dependencies on external 
entities in such scenarios. The quality of our decisions depends on 
multiple key elements. First, we have data, which may contain 
errors, can be corrupted, altered, outdated or just not available when 
needed. Secondly, there are analysis methods and services 
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different from users’ needs and expectations. Finally, we have a 
presentation of results to a decision maker, who needs to correctly 
interpret them in order to make a decision in a local context. Each 
of these elements is susceptible to failures, which can result from 
accidental errors or intentional actions of a 3rd party. In that second 
case, we can talk about threats against decision-making and data 
analysis processes. 
 
Figure 1 A generic decision-making process based on data analysis 
with external data sources and algorithms/models 
2.2.GOALS AND PRIORITIES  
Decision processes based on data analysis solutions should not be 
considered only on the technical level, as they are usually 
associated with some real problems and operate in broader 
contexts, with specific goals and priorities. Let’s take a look at an 
example of a simple scenario with a user interested in purchasing a 
product. The user searches for the item in an online store and 
receives a ranking of options to choose from. The analysis process 
is executed by the store and is external to a user, who has no control 
or even insight into its details.  
The user’s goal can be simple - to find a product that is the best 
balance of price and quality (measured with ratings), but the actual 
analysis may be conducted with different objectives and include a 
criterion like state of an inventory. The goals of a user are therefore 
not fully compatible, or may be even in conflict, with the objectives 
of the analysis process, upon which he depends. Scenarios with 
impact on an individual user obviously cannot be ignored, but this 
becomes a critical problem for decision-making taking place in 
social contexts. 
2.3.SOCIAL CONTEXTS 
Decision process can involve an individual, a social group, a 
company, a community or a society. For the purpose of this 
discussion, let’s assume that the social context can mean two 
things: involvement of multiple participants in a decision-making 
process, or social impact of multiple persons affected by a decision. 
In both of these cases, the goals and priorities of a decision process 
usually need to be clarified, agreed to between multiple parties 
(often through negotiations) and are critical for success. They 
cannot be easily updated and any inconsistencies between goals of 
a decision process and objectives of underlying data analysis must 
be avoided.  
Since decision processes depend on results from data processing 
components, entities controlling these solutions can indirectly 
participate in decision-making. If we want our processes to be 
reliable and trustworthy, we need to define goals and specify 
functional requirements for data sources and analysis solutions that 
are about to be used. But for that we need solid understanding of all 
dependencies, relationships between different components and 
risks related to specific base technologies. This is usually not easy, 
even without social elements, due to the complexity and dynamic 
nature of modern technical systems. Fortunately, this class of 
problems is not necessarily new or unique. 
THREAT MODELING 
Understanding complex systems and their relationships with an 
environment is a common challenge in information and software 
security. Even though most security issues are still related to low-
level vulnerabilities in code or configuration, we need a big picture 
to understand existing threats and their consequences. In order to 
do that, we use threat modeling methodologies to evaluate the 
design of information processing systems in a security context [1]. 
We look at a system, its dependencies, assumptions, and external 
interactions, from the attacker’s point of view and try to identify 
actions that could compromise the system’s security properties, like 
confidentiality, integrity or availability [2].  
Such analysis is strongly based on concepts of trust and control - 
for example, it covers identification of trust boundaries separating 
our system from external entities, as inbound data flows crossing 
them require input validation (in our context, outbound data might 
also require inspection). A resulting threat model can be a base for 
implementing mitigations against enumerated threats and 
coordinating overall security efforts, including very specific 
investments like penetration testing. But most of all, it can help with 
making informed decisions about design and application of specific 
technical solutions. 
3.1.SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS 
We can apply experience from software threat modeling to decision 
processes supported by data analysis, but we will need some 
changes and extensions. The system in our scope reaches beyond 
technical components and includes additional social and business 
dimensions, with special emphasis on human elements in some 
scenarios. We need to extend the scope of analysis to socio-
technical systems [3], which are more dynamic, less transparent 
and harder to model. We also need to revisit some of the base terms 
to update their definitions. For example, the set of assets that we 
are trying to protect should include consistency of goals and 
priorities between a decision process and different underlying data 
processing components.  
Successful attacks against complex systems can be sophisticated, 
subtle and often remain undetected (what is usually one of the 
metrics of their success). In socio-technical systems, an attack may 
have social, economic or political impact, and it may not be obvious 
who actually benefits from it (phenomenon of fake news is a great 
example, [4]). The practical requirements for threat modeling 
socio-technical systems can be based on classical security and 
privacy methods and practices, but need to go beyond and cover all 
non-technical elements and relationships between them, which can 
be very specific to a situation or application. 
3.2.THREATS 
The general threat against decision processes supported by data 
analysis can be defined as an intentional activity aimed at 
disrupting these processes or changing their outcome. In most 
cases, such threats are possible due to dependencies on data sources 
and analysis components that are outside our control.  
Discussion of specific attacks is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
let’s take a look at sample questions indicating possible threats: 
  
a. Data analysis critically depends on the input data, which 
become more important than algorithms. Do we know if 
specific data sources are trusted? Are origins of all data flows 
known and verified? Are the data complete and up-to-date? 
Are they securely stored and transferred all the time? What 
transformations have been applied? Do we know the details of 
data cleaning, normalization, outliers’ removal?  
b. The second group are algorithms and models, which can be 
external to our process (often due to their proprietary status). 
Do we know if results from external algorithms/models are 
correct? Do we know how models were trained and evaluated? 
Were data used in training representative for our application? 
Do they still meet our current requirements and expectations? 
Do we know what are the objectives and priorities of an AI 
agent we integrate with? 
c. Last but not least, we need to look at threats aimed directly at 
decision makers, their contexts and cognitive abilities. Are all 
the pieces of information necessary to make a decision 
available? Are the results presented in a readable and 
unequivocal way? With annotations and explanations where 
needed? Do we always know where specific results are 
coming from? Can they be easily traced back to source data? 
Do we understand the impact of specific results on our 
decision? 
3.3.MITIGATIONS 
Understanding the threats is the first step; in the second one we 
need to implement proper mitigations addressing these threats. We 
have established technical mitigations for most of classical threats, 
related to underlying information processing infrastructure – for 
example, we know how to store and transfer data securely. 
Mitigations for new threats however, related to the nature of socio-
technical systems, or the context of specific data analysis 
applications, need to be researched. 
Effective mitigations can be technical, but also organizational or 
legal. The list below contains some examples related to the 
questions from the previous section: 
a. In the scope of data, we have technical capabilities to verify 
their integrity or origin, but we need clear rules for data 
ownership, quality metrics, tracking data flows and processing 
history. Some cases may be difficult, for example when data 
are contributed by many anonymous users. External data 
should always be validated, but also outbound data may need 
checks aimed at verification if no confidential or PII data are 
shared with external entities. All interactions with data might 
be also recorded to support nonrepudiation.  
b. When it comes to analysis algorithms and models we may 
need information like up-to-date metrics, configurations or 
training summaries. The more complex model, the more 
difficult it is to validate its results in a functional context of an 
application and we may need independent evaluations, 
explanations [5] or certifications. Sometimes we should 
analyze the same data several times using different models and 
compare results. In some cases, like advanced proprietary 
solutions or autonomous AI agents, a specific contractual 
service agreement, covering also analysis objectives and 
priorities, may be required.  
c. Finally, threats against human elements can be addressed by 
properly designed analysis user experiences, with adjustments 
to context of specific application and different roles or tasks. 
Individual needs, requirements and preferences can be 
managed with advanced personalization and visual decision 
support focused on identification of possible gaps, ambiguities 
or inconsistencies. There should always be a path to get from 
visualization products, through all applied transformations 
and analysis methods to the original source data. 
CONCLUSION 
Decision processes supported by data analysis technologies have 
great potential, as they can make our decisions more effective, 
accurate and rational. But for that we need processes and technical 
solutions that are reliable, trustworthy and cannot be easily 
compromised. This requires good understanding of our goals and 
requirements, the assets we want to protect, the related threats and 
limits of available mitigations.  
Threat modeling methodologies adapted to socio-technical systems 
and the nature of data analysis applications can become a solid 
foundation for gaining such insight. They can be useful not only for 
designing and implementing technical mitigations, but also for 
establishing new rules and best practices for emerging types of data 
analysis businesses, or shared research efforts, with clearly defined 
requirements towards creating fair relationships and healthy data 
ecosystems. 
4.1.FUTURE 
Using threat modeling methodologies is a great starting point, but 
it is only a first step. Security efforts are continuous in their nature; 
as technologies and their applications are changing, so are the 
related threats, what leads to the need for improved mitigations. 
This seems especially important for decision-making in social 
contexts, due to complexity, dynamics, and potentially broad 
impact of these scenarios. 
And complexity will increase along with the development of 
technologies, not only in the scope of data analysis. New types of 
user interfaces, including augmented or virtual reality, will enable 
new data analysis experiences, new cooperation scenarios and 
much closer integration with AI agents. This will also inevitably 
result in new types of threats against human elements, or decision 
makers in our specific context.  
We need to continuously investigate threats in new data analysis 
scenarios and applications, and we should use lessons from 
information and software security whenever possible. We cannot 
focus only on the benefits and opportunities of new technologies. 
If we do, we may soon find our decision processes to be very 
effective and accurate, but not necessarily aligned with our goals 
and priorities. 
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